Skip to content

Commit

Permalink
Fixed printf format specifier bug causing fails.
Browse files Browse the repository at this point in the history 
mbed-os on the L476 did not implement the %02x padding specifier.
As a result, leading zeroes were droped and the GUI verification
tests were failing. Instead of implementing a check, the two
key print functions handle the format. They aren't time critical.
  • Loading branch information
@petertorelli
petertorelli committed Jan 26, 2021
1 parent 5f91e26 commit 29858d2
Showing 1 changed file with 58 additions and 38 deletions.
96 changes: 58 additions & 38 deletions profile/ee_profile.c
View file
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#include "ee_variations.h"
#include "th_util.h"

#define EE_FW_VERSION "SecureMark-TLS Firmware v1.0.3"
#define EE_FW_VERSION "SecureMark-TLS Firmware v1.0.4"
#define EE_PRINTMEM_DEFAULT_HEADER "m-hexdump-";

// What mode we are currently in (perf or verf) [see monitor/th_api/th_lib.c]
Expand All @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static unsigned char g_prn_coeff = 0;
*
* @param hex without decoration, case insensitive.
*
* @return -1 on error; but if the result is > size(long)
* @return -1 on error; but if the result is > size(long)
* the number is invalid (there is no character counting)
* and no error generated.
*
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ ee_printmem(unsigned char *addr, size_t len, char *user_header)
{
size_t i;
char *header;
char b;

if (user_header == NULL)
{
Expand All @@ -117,12 +118,21 @@ ee_printmem(unsigned char *addr, size_t len, char *user_header)
{
header = user_header;
}

th_printf(header);

for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
{
th_printf("%02x", addr[i]);
// Some libc printf's don't provide padding, e.g., %02x
b = addr[i];
if (b <= 0xf)
{
th_printf("0%x", b);
}
else
{
th_printf("%x", b);
}
if ((i + 1) % 16 == 0)
{
th_printf("\r\n");
Expand All @@ -136,7 +146,7 @@ ee_printmem(unsigned char *addr, size_t len, char *user_header)
th_printf("-");
}
}

if (i % 16 != 0)
{
th_printf("\r\n");
Expand All @@ -153,6 +163,7 @@ ee_printmem_be(unsigned char *p_addr, size_t len, char *p_user_header)
{
size_t i;
char *p_header;
char b;

if (p_user_header == NULL)
{
Expand All @@ -167,7 +178,16 @@ ee_printmem_be(unsigned char *p_addr, size_t len, char *p_user_header)
th_printf("0x");
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
{
th_printf("%02x", p_addr[i]);
// Some libc printf's don't provide padding, e.g., %02x
b = p_addr[i];
if (b <= 0xf)
{
th_printf("0%x", b);
}
else
{
th_printf("%x", b);
}
}
th_printf("\r\n");
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -275,15 +295,15 @@ ee_bench_parse(char *p_command)

unsigned int i; // iterations
unsigned int n; // data size in bytes

if (th_strncmp(p_command, "bench", EE_CMD_SIZE) != 0)
{
return EE_ARG_UNCLAIMED;
}

/**
* Each subcommand takes four paramters:
*
*
* subcmd : the name of the primitive to benchmark
* seed : the decimal positive integer seed
* iter : the decimal positive integer iteration count
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -349,18 +369,18 @@ ee_bench_parse(char *p_command)
unsigned char *p_in;
unsigned char *p_out;
size_t x;

// in out
buflen = n + SHA_SIZE;

p_buffer = (unsigned char *)th_malloc(buflen);

if (p_buffer == NULL)
{
th_printf("e-[SHA256 malloc() failed, size %d]\r\n", buflen);
goto error_exit;
}

// Assign the helper points to the region of the p_buffer
p_in = p_buffer;
p_out = p_in + n;
Expand All @@ -375,7 +395,7 @@ ee_bench_parse(char *p_command)
ee_printmem_be(p_out, SHA_SIZE, "m-bench-sha256-hash-");
}
th_free(p_buffer);
}
}
else if (th_strncmp(p_subcmd, "aes128_ecb", EE_CMD_SIZE) == 0)
{
unsigned char *p_buffer;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -407,23 +427,23 @@ ee_bench_parse(char *p_command)
}

ee_aes128_ecb(p_key, p_in, n, p_out, AES_ENC, i);

if (g_verify_mode)
{
ee_printmem_be(p_key, 16, "m-bench-aes128_ecb_enc-key-");
ee_printmem_be(p_in, n, "m-bench-aes128_ecb_enc-in-");
ee_printmem_be(p_out, n, "m-bench-aes128_ecb_enc-out-");
}

ee_aes128_ecb(p_key, p_out, n, p_in, AES_DEC, i);

if (g_verify_mode)
{
ee_printmem_be(p_key, 16, "m-bench-aes128_ecb_dec-key-");
ee_printmem_be(p_out, n, "m-bench-aes128_ecb_dec-in-");
ee_printmem_be(p_in, n, "m-bench-aes128_ecb_dec-out-");
}

th_free(p_buffer);
}
else if (th_strncmp(p_subcmd, "aes128_ccm", EE_CMD_SIZE) == 0) {
Expand All @@ -445,7 +465,7 @@ ee_bench_parse(char *p_command)
th_printf("e-[AES128 CCM malloc() failed, size %d]\r\n", buflen);
goto error_exit;
}

// Assign the helper points to the region of the buffer
p_key = p_buffer;
p_iv = p_key + AES_KEYSIZE;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -480,9 +500,9 @@ ee_bench_parse(char *p_command)
ee_printmem_be(p_tag, AES_TAGSIZE, "m-bench-aes128_ccm_enc-tag-");
ee_printmem_be(p_out, n, "m-bench-aes128_ccm_enc-out-");
}

ee_aes128_ccm(p_key, p_iv, p_out, n, p_tag, p_in, AES_DEC, i);

if (g_verify_mode)
{
ee_printmem_be(p_key, AES_KEYSIZE, "m-bench-aes128_ccm_dec-key-");
Expand All @@ -491,12 +511,12 @@ ee_bench_parse(char *p_command)
ee_printmem_be(p_tag, AES_TAGSIZE, "m-bench-aes128_ccm_dec-tag-");
ee_printmem_be(p_in, n, "m-bench-aes128_ccm_dec-out-");
}

th_free(p_buffer);
}
}
/**
* We require the ability to send our own key to the ECC functions to
* prevent cheating the test. Some APIs make it very difficult to
* prevent cheating the test. Some APIs make it very difficult to
* provide our own secret, but they do offer a way to load keys. So,
* we use the generic th_buffer to load the keys using buffer-add
* commands on the host.
Expand All @@ -515,7 +535,7 @@ ee_bench_parse(char *p_command)
* ECDH Key mixing
*
* Preload buffer with:
*
*
* Value Size (Bytes)
* Q.X 32 (Peer public key uncompressed 32-byte X valid coord)
* Q.Y 32 (Peer public key uncompressed 32-byte Y valid coord)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -544,7 +564,7 @@ ee_bench_parse(char *p_command)
* ECDSA Sign & Verify a hash
*
* Preload buffer with:
*
*
* Value Size (Bytes)
* unused 32
* unused 32
Expand All @@ -559,26 +579,26 @@ ee_bench_parse(char *p_command)

slen = 256; // Note: this is also an input to ee_ecdsa_sign
p_sig = (unsigned char *)th_malloc(slen); // should be 71, 72 B

if (p_sig == NULL)
{
th_printf("e-[ECDSA malloc() failed, size %d]\r\n", 256);
goto error_exit;
}

p_pri = th_buffer_address() + 64;
p_hmac = p_pri + ECC_DSIZE;

ee_ecdsa_sign(p_hmac, HMAC_SIZE, p_sig, &slen, p_pri, ECC_DSIZE, i);

if (g_verify_mode) {
ee_printmem_be(p_pri, ECC_DSIZE, "m-bench-ecdsa-sign-own-private-");
ee_printmem_be(p_sig, slen, "m-bench-ecdsa-sign-signature-");
ee_printmem_be(p_hmac, HMAC_SIZE, "m-bench-ecdsa-sign-hash-");
}

ee_ecdsa_verify(p_hmac, HMAC_SIZE, p_sig, slen, p_pri, ECC_DSIZE, i);

th_free(p_sig);
}
else if (th_strncmp(p_subcmd, "var01", EE_CMD_SIZE) == 0)
Expand All @@ -603,12 +623,12 @@ ee_buffer_parse(char *p_command)
char *p_subcmd; // Subcommand
char *p_next; // Next token in subcommand parse
long hex; // String-to-hex byte (see ee_hexdec)

if (th_strncmp(p_command, "buffer", EE_CMD_SIZE) != 0)
{
return EE_ARG_UNCLAIMED;
}

p_subcmd = th_strtok(NULL, EE_CMD_DELIMITER);

if (p_subcmd == NULL)
Expand All @@ -624,7 +644,7 @@ ee_buffer_parse(char *p_command)
if (p_next)
{
hex = ee_hexdec(p_next);

if (hex < 0)
{
th_printf("e-[Buffer fill invalid byte: %s]\r\n", p_next);
Expand All @@ -642,7 +662,7 @@ ee_buffer_parse(char *p_command)
else if (th_strncmp(p_subcmd, "add", EE_CMD_SIZE) == 0)
{
p_next = th_strtok(NULL, EE_CMD_DELIMITER);

if (p_next == NULL)
{
th_printf("e-[Buffer add expects at least on byte]\r\n");
Expand All @@ -652,16 +672,16 @@ ee_buffer_parse(char *p_command)
while (p_next != NULL)
{
hex = ee_hexdec(p_next);
if (hex < 0)

if (hex < 0)
{
th_printf("e-[Buffer add invalid byte: %s]\r\n", p_next);
}
else
{
ee_buffer_add(hex);
}

p_next = th_strtok(NULL, EE_CMD_DELIMITER);
}
}
Expand Down

0 comments on commit 29858d2

Please sign in to comment.